# Chapter Twenty-Five - Strategyproof Social Choice

@article{Barber2011ChapterT, title={Chapter Twenty-Five - Strategyproof Social Choice}, author={Salvador Barber{\`a}}, journal={Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare}, year={2011}, volume={2}, pages={731-831} }

This chapter surveys the literature on strategy proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on social choice models.

#### 54 Citations

Euclidean preferences, option sets and strategyproofness

- Economics
- 2011

In this note, we use the technique of option sets to sort out the implications of coalitional strategyproofness in the spatial setting. We also discuss related issues and open problems.

Collusion-proof and fair auctions

- Computer Science
- 2019

In the standard auction model, a necessary and sufficient condition on the value domain under which non-trivial mechanisms exist that satisfy group strategy-proofness and symmetry is provided if values are drawn from a finite set. Expand

‘Social choice and welfare’ at 30: its role in the development of social choice theory and welfare economics

- Economics, Computer Science
- Soc. Choice Welf.
- 2014

This paper is a subjective overview of the parallel development of the journal and the subjects it covers. Expand

On the Different Forms of Individual and Group Strategic Behavior, and Their Impact on Efficiency

- Economics
- 2018

We survey a number of results regarding incentives and efficiency that have been recently added to the social choice literature, and we establish parallels and differences with the concepts and… Expand

Strategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasilinear exchange economies

- Economics
- 2014

In this paper, we revisit a long-standing question on the structure of strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient social choice functions (SCFs) in classical exchange economies (Hurwicz (1972)). Using… Expand

A fundamental structure of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with restricted preferences over alternatives

- Mathematics, Computer Science
- Soc. Choice Welf.
- 2014

It is proved that circular sets of preferences over alternatives are sufficient for the existence of a decisive agent under each strategy-proof and unanimous social choice correspondence. Expand

A decomposition of strategy-proofness

- Mathematics, Computer Science
- Soc. Choice Welf.
- 2016

It is found that strategy-proofness is decomposed into three axioms: top-restricted AM-Proofness, weak monotonicity, and individual bounded response. Expand

Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments

- Economics, Computer Science
- Soc. Choice Welf.
- 2015

These results extend Roberts’ affine maximizer theorem to the case of two alternatives and show that under a mild range condition, every implementable allocation rule is a generalized utility function maximizer. Expand

Monotone strategyproofness

- Computer Science
- Games Econ. Behav.
- 2016

A way to compare the extent of preference misrepresentation between two strategies is proposed and it is found that any deterministic social choice function on any domain is strategyproof if, and only if, it is monotone strategyproof. Expand

Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series Working Paper n o 712 Monotone Strategyproofness

- 2013

We propose a way to compare the extent of preference misrepresentation between two strategies. We define a mechanism to be monotone strategyproof when declaring a “more truthful” preference ordering… Expand

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